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In her writing, Prof. Chow humbly claims her foreignness to the field of
American Studies. In a similar manner, I must claim not only my foreignness too
but also my ignorance in the fields of political science and cultural studies. But in
a sense, it may be fitting that I, as someone foreign to those fields, comment on
these papers. We gather here crossing disciplinary as well as linguistic
boundaries, precisely because we desire to listen and learn from multiple
perspectives. Through this, we hope to initiate the process of speaking, what
Professor Chow calls, “a new kind of ‘we,’ a collectivity based on the
ineluctability of heterolinguality, drawing from Naoki Sakai’s concepts. I hope
that my perspective, as an expert outside of these fields, fosters the creation of this
new kind of collectivity.
I must confess, however, that the task I was assigned was more challenging
than I had anticipated. This is because the three papers were not only in three
different disciplines, but deal with entirely different topics. Additionally, none of
the papers focused on gender, the framework of this conference. If I were to
attempt to integrate my discussion of the three into this conference framework, I
would have to ignore the main points of each. Rather than attempt this
integration, please allow me to comment on each paper individually, and from my
non-specialist point of view.
I. Comments on Professor Mastanduno’s paper
Professor Mastanduno convincingly argues that the U. S. is likely to continue
to shirk multilateralism even after the Bush administration. I was among those
who expected that the U. S. would shift its foreign policy back toward
multilateralism again. I thought that the current Bush administration deeply hurt
the U. S. in isolating the country from the rest of the world. This is the case not
only with its invasion of Iraq but also with environmental and other important
global issues. A shift towards multilateralism seemed to me a likely and
reasonable form of redress.
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If my understanding is correct, Professor Mastanduno’s paper is especially
significant in raising the following two points: (1) the Bush administration was
not, after all, that anti-multilateral. The Bush team, like previous U. S.
administrations, employed multilateralism whenever it thought that it would be
more beneficial to U. S. interests. This can be observed in its commitment to
multilateral institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, and its restored liason
with NATO. (2) Even an Obama administration―if he wins the presidential
campaign―wants to change the U. S. policy towards multilateralism; U. S.
foreign policy cannot be as multilateral as they might desire. This is due to such
factors as historical tradition and domestic economic stagnation, which make it
more difficult to take such a course. Professor Mastanduno demonstrates very
realistic analyses of the U. S. foreign policy from the past to the present, as well
as shrewd speculation about the near future.
I would like to respond to Professor Mastanduno’ s argument with three
questions. My first question concerns the concept of multilateralism itself. I
agree that as Professor Mastanduno states, the US resorts so frequently to
unilateralist foreign policy “because it believes it is powerful enough to get away
with it” (p. 15). This power implies that the U. S. is exceptional in practicing
unilateralism for this reason. If the U. S. is exceptional in that sense, the question
arises―can we discuss multilateralism in the U. S. in the same framework as that
of other countries? For other leading nations including Japan, foreign policy can
be achieved most realistically through multilateral institutions such as the UN and
G-8 summits. Thus, the question remains, is the multilateralism the U. S.
employs for its own benefits the same kind of multilateralism as other countries
practice, given that none of them, even relatively powerful ones, have the same
level of world hegemony as the U. S.?
This leads to my second question. I wonder whether in the future, the binary
between unilateralism and multilateralism will remain as valid as it has been in
the past. It seems that in a sense that boundary is becoming more and more
blurred as world geopolitics is changing dramatically to accommodate rapidly
rising countries such as China and India. An example of this occurred at the
Toyako Summit, which was held just a couple of weeks ago. There, the U. S.
showed an ambiguous pose regarding the global warming issue. The U. S.,
alongside seven other countries, agreed to set the numerical goal of a 50 percent
reduction of CO2 emissions. In the process, Bush repeatedly claimed that it was
indispensable to include China and India at the table where efforts to dramatically
decrease the emission amount were being discussed. Here the U. S. effectively
avoided concentrated criticisms against it for its reluctance to face the issue by
pointing fingers at China and India. One way of interpreting this is to argue that
the U. S. is disguising its traditional unilateralism, i. e. the U. S. does not want to
take an aggressive action to stop the global warming. The other way of looking at
this is that it is becoming more difficult for the U. S. to stay unilateral, difficult
enough that it feels necessary to point fingers at the other “bad guys.” Is this a
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signal that the identity of the U. S. is shifting under global pressure? It may mean
that the U. S. is no long able to employ the unilateralism it once did, but does not
wish to engage in a true multilateral foreign policy. Thus, it employs tactics that
blend multilateralism and unilateralism, shifting the meaning of these terms.
I would like to pose a final question about the implications of Professor
Mastanduno’s work. I wonder, how will the rest of the world react to the U. S. if
it continues to take unilateralism as its guiding foreign policy? Will the EU and
other leading countries like Japan have no other choice but to maintain their forms
of multilateralism like they have to now, or will they make a coalition to exclude
the U. S. from their form of multilateralism?
II. Comments on Professor Chow’s paper
Professor Chow’s interesting analyses of Kurosawa’s two films, “No Regrets
for Our Youth” and “Rhapsody in August”, lead us to two sets of important
questions. The first regards how the U. S. and Japan involved themselves in
constructing the discourse of war and peace. The second set of questions regards
how people in each society reacted to such discourses about war and peace.
It would be safe to say that “Rhapsody in August,” produced in 1991, was
clearly intended to address the heterolingual audience. It received harsh criticism
particularly by American critics, many of whom claimed that its portrayal of the
Japanese was one sided. Specifically, they argued that Kurosawa portrayed
Japanese people as “mere victims,” ignoring Japanese aggression against Asia. It
is said that two scenes in the film have been particularly controversial. The first
is the scene of an atomic bomb memorial park where Tami and other
grandchildren make a remark that the U. S. did not send a memorial to the bomb
victims because it dropped the bomb. The second is the scene where Clark, her
nephew from her brother and American sister in law, apologizes to Kane. I
would argue, however, that such reaction blocks any metaphoric reading of the
film. This reaction situates the atomic bomb as a mere “sign” that, for them,
always must induce spontaneous reference to Pearl Harbor and Japan’s invasion
to Asia even in a 100 minute film. I do not think that any good artist or deep
thinker would like that kind of straight-forward method.
Yoshimoto points out that this remark by her grandchildren is made only once
in the film and there is no endorsement attempted throughout the rest of the film
(2002: 366). The same goes for another scene where Kane’s son and daughter,
Tadao and Yoshie, accused the grandchildren of making a mistake by mentioning
in their telegram to Suzujiro that Kane’s husband died in the atomic blast in
Nagasaki. The critics’ reaction to the first scene amounts to a political charge that
blocks any metaphoric reading of the film.
Needless to say, neither of the first two scenes, one at the memorial park and
the other where Kane’s son and daughter criticized their children for mentioning
the atomic bomb, represents Kurosawa’s interpretation of the war. The former
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scene at the memorial park represents a typical discourse regarding Nagasaki’s
atomic bomb in Japan and a typical discourse in America regarding Japanese
reaction to it. The scene where Kane’s son and daughter criticize their children
for mentioning the A-bomb presumably represents a set of discourses found in
Japanese society on Americans’ reactions toward the war and Nagasaki. It is for
this reason that both scenes were not endorsed by another scene.
It seems to me that it was Kurosawa’s intention to show in the first half of the
film a heterolingual understanding of what “America” means among the
Japanese, supposedly a homolingual group, and even within the same family.
For Kane’s daughter and son, America is a country of wealth. For this reason,
they approach their relatives in Hawaii in the hope of making a business
partnership with them. With regard to the war, the scene where Kane’s son and
daughter criticize their children for mentioning the A-bomb in their telegram to
Suzijiro in Hawaii presumably represents a set of discourses found in Japanese
society on Americans’ reactions toward the A-bombs. That is, any topic related
to Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be best avoided in any conversation or
communication with Americans. Even her family members did not understand
the depth of Kane’s sorrow about the loss of her husband to the atomic blast, was
so deep that it inhibited her from visiting her own ill brother in Hawaii.
The situation changes, however, when the Kana family spent the summer with
her. This culminates with Clark’s visit to Kane to pay his respects to her dead
husband. Clark breaks such stereotypes of Americans. He came to visit Kane to
pay respects to her deceased husband. The family then starts to deepen their
understanding of Kane.
It seems that Kurosawa navigates us through these scenes for a dual purpose.
First, he aims to transcend the discourses involving war and post-war constructed
in the closed space within each nation-state and some reactions toward these
scenes. Second, he aims to anticipate and respond to the reactions, especially
overseas, to these scenes, in order to raise a more fundamental and universal
question regarding acts of war and the subsequent life-long wounds and sorrows
of the surviving humans.
As for the final scene, Prof. Chow analyzes it saying: “it demonstrates that
“defenses” are things that cannot and will not last?” (p. 26). In the final scene,
rain is falling out of the dark-grey sky, and suddenly, a gust of wind turns her
umbrella inside out. Is it possible to read this umbrella as a signifier to represent
both a rose and the A-bomb mushroom cloud? It seems to me that the last scene
refers to a couple of crucial scenes in the middle of the film: one where the
camera zooms up the countless ants making a line to clamber up the rose stem;
and, the other scene where Kane’s son explains the meaning of a displayed
calligraphy of an old saying in Japanese, “one can see deceased beloved ones
again in the next world.” It is unlikely Kurosawa included those two long scenes
without any aim to refer back to them. Just like the ants moving up the rose in
line, Kane’s family forms a line to chase after Kane in the thunderstorm. One
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way of reading the umbrella could be that it signifies strong love, that of Kane
toward her husband as well as her family’s’ love toward her. Kane, who is
confused and searches for her husband in Nagasaki, mistakes the lightning for the
atomic bomb. The time in this scene moves backward, but in a sense, it points
forward to a future that encompasses an anticipation of death. Kane’s strong
passion to call for her deceased husband did not diminish, even with Clark’s
wholehearted apology. However, the only way she can see her husband again is
to go to heaven just like the old saying describes. That is why it seems to me that
the umbrella in the lightning, which can be fatal as it charred the trees, also
signifies the atomic bomb, implying her death to come. And the moment her
umbrella turns inside out is the time when her life is about to finally be fulfilled.
Although my reading of the last scene may slightly differ from that of Prof.
Chow, I agree with her insightful comments on the linguistic shift that likely
indicates Kurosawa’ s implicit message about the universal rejection of war.
Professor Chow convincingly makes this point by drawing attention to third-
person narratives found in the dialogue between Kane and Clark.
The second film, “No Regrets for Our Youth,” produced in 1946, is widely
regarded as a GHQ’s propaganda film to promote the idea of democracy in post-
war Japan. In her analysis of contrasting “before” and “after” in this film, Prof.
Chow highlights the contrast between the Western and modern life and the
Japanese traditional life in a rural village, which is characterized by rice
cultivation. However, the scenes before the war include one where Yukie
engages in Japanese traditional flower arrangement. Therefore, it was not just
Western and modern lifestyle before the war. Professor Chow does mention
Yukie’s bourgeoisie background, but I pay closer attention to the contrast between
the prewar bourgeoisie urban lifestyle full of consumption and luxury and the
simple lifestyle in the rural village, which focuses on nothing but production.
Considering that the film takes place in 1946, when most Japanese were leading
devastated lives, having lost everything and trying to start from the scratch, I
question whether GHQ is trying to convey to the viewers the importance of
intense labor and production. The village in the film is interestingly depicted as
an egalitarian community without any hint of hierarchies, even though Yukie had
to fight against severe prejudice and discrimination. It might have been that the
GHQ desired such an egalitarian society for traditional Japanese rural
communities and thus depicted them as such. Moreover, the final scene where
Yukie was warmly accepted by the villagers after the war to become a heroic
leader of the feminist liberation and cultural movement may reflect, in my
reading, the GHQ’s intention to depict how thoroughly and successfully the ideas
of democracy and freedom spread throughout Japan even into such a remote rural
village.
As some of the Japanese film critics have pointed out, Yukie does not look
truly happy at the ending scene. I agree with their interpretation that Kurosawa
embedded his resistance to GHQ in the final scene. There is, it seems to me, no
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real hero or heroine in the film. Given the absence of a true hero, as well as
Yukie’s unhappy looks in spite of her achievements and the peasants’ unnatural
smiles, I would read this scene as conveying Kurosawa’s strategic intention to
claim that the shutaisei involving war crime is not something articulated with a
simple frame of who is right and who is wrong.
III. Comments on Professor Lee’s paper
I am pleased to find that I share very similar academic interest with Professor
Lee. Professor Lee’ s paper is particularly significant in pointing out the
following: 1) It highlights multiracial Americans, a segment of the American
population that is growing rapidly today; 2) it presents research results based on
her interviews as well as her analysis of the 2000 census data; and, 3) most
importantly, it argues that the black-white color line would again re-emerge if
Latinos and Asians become integrated in the white category as her study found
that multiracial Asians and Latinos are closer to whites than to blacks.
Since this topic is closely related to my own research interest, naturally I have
a number of questions I would like to raise. I will name a few:
1) Professor Lee’s paper, especially the interview section, builds the argument
that multiracial Asians tend to identity themselves more with whites. Though this
thesis is compelling, it is important as well to note the diversity among multi-
racial Asian-Americans. Even given her limited space, it would be preferable that
she present some cases that contrast her thesis from her interview data, in order to
convey that this diversity is present.
2) There is a logical difference between how a minority member identifies
herself or himself and how he or she is accepted and integrated into the white
mainstream society. In other words, even though some multiracial Asians may
identify themselves with whites, it does not automatically follow that they are
closer to whites than to blacks in terms of their treatment at the hands of society at
large. They may face discrimination or marginalization more closely resembling
that of non-white groups, even as they identify themselves as white.
3) My third comment is with regard to the color line in the U. S. The location
of the color line seems to dramatically shift depending on what aspect of
American society one examines. If one looks at higher education, the color line is
between whites/Asians and blacks/Latinos. If one looks at the art world, as I will
elaborate upon in a moment, it is between whites and non-whites.
4) My final comment deals with the “forever foreigner” stereotype that Asian
Americans experience. According to the 2000 census, two thirds of people of
Asian descent are foreign-born, and there is no indication at present that this
proportion will shift significantly in the near future. Partially as a result of this
demographic reality, the “forever foreigners” stereotype has become among the
most persistent that Asian Americans experience. If mass migration from Asia
continues, the forever foreigner stereotype is likely to work against Asian
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Americans’ likelihood of being incorporated into the white category. The identity
of multiracial Americans is often strongly affected by how others identify them.
It is not unusual that even among siblings, one’s racial identity is completely
different from that of the other depending on how each looks. Therefore, this
stereotype may make it even more challenging for multiracial Asian Americans
who identify themselves as white to be perceived that way in the wider U. S.
society.
In my oral presentation at the 2008 NASSS, I addressed some of these points
by sharing my own research findings from one of my current projects that
investigates the issue of Asian American identity among Asian American artists.
1
I will omit the main portion on my own work here as I plan to publish it
elsewhere. The following is part of the essence of my findings.
Among the all artists I interviewed, there seems to be actually nobody whose
art is unrelated to his or her racial and ethnic identity. Even some successful
young artists who are known for their universalist oriented work have been
influenced by race and ethnicity, as their works developed out of their
upbringings rooted in racial and ethnic terms.
The issue of race seems to be suppressed, marginalized, and discouraged from
being visible in the white dominated art field after the shift from multiculturalism.
And even multiculturalism was only recognized and celebrated up to certain
extent. There is undeniably a social reality of race in mainstream American
society, and it does manifest in Asian American arts now, too, though only in
subtle and modest, and often secretly embedded ways.
Notes
1 The project is primarily based on the personal interviews I conducted so far with 31 Asian
American artists and ten curators in six regions including New York, Los Angeles, the Bay
Area, and Seattle, with special attention given to the young artists and curators who took
part in the exhibition entitled One Way or Another: Asian American Art Now, organized by
the Asia Society in New York during the Fall of 2006, which traveled around the nation
until the summer of 2008. Please see Yasuko Takezawa, “Race and Identities in the Post-
Multiculturalism Era: Self-Representations among Asian American Artists,” ( in Japanese)
in Takezawa ed. Jinshu no Hyosho to Shakaiteki Realitei ( Representations of Race and
Social Reality), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 2009. The English version will be available later.
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